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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, we present results of an experimental study in order to generate a secure
cryptographic key from the user’s voice which is to be shared between two mobile devices. We
identified two security threats related to this problem, discussed the challenges to design the key
generation/ sharing mechanism, and proposed a new protocol based on bloom filters that
overcomes the two main attacks by the intruder. One is when the attacker places its device in
the close vicinity of the location where the user attempts to generate/ share the key in order to
derive the key from eavesdropping on communication messages. The second is when the
attacker visually observes the experiment being performed and it tries to replicate the same
experiment to reproduce the key. We present several results that demonstrate the practicality
of our proposed technique in the context of communications between smart-phone

v

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
In recent times, there has been an extensive research on mobile devices security and key
generation between mobile devices for secure transfer of data, but still there is ample scope of
improvement and innovation required in these areas. Gartner, an American research and
advisory firm’s research shows that by 2018 more than 50% of users will use tablet or smartphone
first for all online activities. Google also states that searches on mobile devices already surpassed
PCs in US. The wearable market is exploding today with numerous applications in healthcare.
Needless to say, secure and privacy for mobile devices is an important problem. In this thesis, we
focus on the broad problem of enabling two mobile devices securely communicate with each
other without the need for an external infrastructure like the Internet.
1.1 Motivation for the Problem
As we know, passwords and biometrics etc. are used for securing a mobile device, but
they are not used for key generation. To make communications between devices secure, we need
secret keys between the communicating parties. There are schemes proposed where public key
crypto can be used, wherein the public key is open, but the private key is secret. However, these
are complex in terms of overhead, and also, in the domain of mobile devices like smart-phones
which are shared by users, even private keys can be exposed.
In fact, as evidence of the significance of this work, we present in the Appendix some
discussions on an implementation we have conducted wherein a Bluetooth sniffer was used to
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sniff the communication between a Fitbit wearable device and a smartphone. While details are
presented in the Appendix, we clarify here that such an attack is entirely feasible with
appropriate engineering techniques designed to sniff wireless communications, and existing
static key based schemes are not effective to mitigate such attacks (especially for mobile devices
which are shared at times)
As a result, the motivation of this thesis is to enable run time generation of keys that are
shared between two devices just prior to the start of a communication. Core requirements are
the following
a. Before the start of a secure communication, our technique should ensure that both
devices share the same key with a high probability without sending the key in plaintext.
b. The generation of keys must be user initiated.
c. At each round of communication, the key generation must be unique from prior keys.
d. The protocol must be robust enough to prevent practical attackers from exposing the
key under two attacks. The first attack model is a) one where the adversary is in the
vicinity of the on-going communication initiated by the user and the attacker tries to
eavesdrop on the communication to decipher they key. We call this attack as a passive
attack. The second attack model is more of an active attack where the attacker tries to
replicate whatever action the user initiates to setup the key in order to recreate the key.
We will also demonstrate the experiment of sniffing by using a Bluetooth Low Energy
sensor when the data is being transferred from a wearable device to phone.
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1.2 Proposed Approach
Our proposed approach is explained in Figure 1.1. The user places both communicating
devices in close proximity, and generates an audio signal through his/her vocal cords.
Subsequently, each of the two devices converts the resulting time domain sound pressure signal
to absolute FFT where it will have all the frequency components of the signal embedded into it.
We parse the absolute FFT of the signal for the values which will be shared between the two
mobile devices. We use these amplitude values to generate the shared secret key, which we
explain subsequently. At this point, each of the two devices will have generated the values which
are to be shared across the other mobile device to generate a key. Now it will be the case that
(more) number of amplitude values in the signal will be the same for both devices, but some of
them will be different. Also, we do not want to let these amplitude values be transmitted in plain
text. If the data is transferred in plain text, it gives the intruder a high chance to decipher the
data when he obtained from eavesdropping. To still enable key sharing with a high probability,
the devices will embed their parsed values in a Bloom Filter independently and share with the
other device. Each device will then verify if their derived values from their sound pressure signal
are in the other device’s Bloom filter. With the right choice of parameters in the bloom filter, we
can ensure that false positives are very low. Subsequently, the matched entries are integrated to
form the shared key. The proposed protocol overcome the two main practical attacks by the
intruder. The entire protocol is presented in detail subsequent sections.

3

Figure 1.1 Process flow of the proposed protocol
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1.3 Issues Faced in the Research
To the best of our knowledge, this problem is unique and the proposed solution is also
unique. Since the work is pioneering, there are a number of challenges to deal with. We identify
them below.
a. The impact of vowels and consonants: The sounds produced by vowels, consonants,
words etc. are all different. For an instance we observed maximum sound pressure was
for vowel sounds, while the signal oscillated low levels for consonant sounds. Vowel
sounds are produced with on open vocal tract, so that the tongue doesn’t touch lips, teeth
or the roof of the mouth. There is no build-up of air pressure above the glottis. This
enables high peaks in the sound produced. This is in contrast to the consonants sound
produced, where there is closure at some point along the vocal tract and the tongue is
touching teeth, lips or roof of the mouth unlike vowels. For whole words, we observed
the peaks at the times where vowels are spoken. The time and frequency at which each
of the sound produced is also quite unique. In these experiments we took into
consideration of the sounds produced by the vowels, consonants, and whole words to see
how each of these impacted key sharing.
b. The impact of uttering words instead of characters: On an average words with Vowels in
between them share more number of bits compared to only vowel sounds, but the
intruder is able to eavesdrop 8% of the shared data during the word uttering process
compared to that of only vowels, which is only 2% - 3%. Also in consonant sounds the
intruder is able to get more than 15% of the shared data of the original experiment. So,
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from the experiments we observed that the security is better in single vowels followed by
whole words and consonants.
c. The impact of the decibel level of the uttered sound (loud vs. normal vs. whisper): We
performed the experiments in three levels of the sound and measured the decibel level
for them. We observed that the loud sound is produced at the average of 72 dB, normal
sound is produced at an average of 61 dB and whisper is produced at an average of 44 dB.
We observed that on an average whisper sound shared more number of bits compared
to the all the levels of sound, but intruder can eavesdrop more than 20% of shared data
compared to the normal sound where only 2%-3% of the shared data is exposed to the
intruder.
1.4 A Note on Related Works on Voice Recognition for Security
The usage of voice as a biometric for cyber security is quite old. The basic idea to match
a voice at runtime with known samples of the user’s voice derived during training. Applications
of this lie in many domains including smart-phones where user’s voice are being used for
authenticating a user. There are software like Agnitio Voice ID, in the market where it can be
installed on the mobile device for authenticating the user. There are two downfalls to be
addressed here, one is the user need to train the program with set of phrases and the software
will only work for those predefined phrases. The second issue is if the mobile by mistakenly
shared with the intruder when the device is unlocked and had the trained data locally, the
intruder can get access to data (audio file) associated with them. Now, as the intruder is having
the audio files he might reproduce the signal and imitate like the original user.
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While most of the present day voice authentication software use complex algorithms like
Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficient (MFCC), Dynamic Time Wrapping (DTW) etc. which require
lot of computation power and its complexity to implement on mobile device. The above
mentioned software does not provide authentication independently. Which means the data
needs to be sent to the server over the internet and the speech data is processed over there and
sent back to the mobile. Here another range of security issues rises about the communication
channels of internet. Also, these techniques only enable authentication and do not discuss the
problem of sharing keys between two devices, which is explained in our experiments. Each time
when the user speaks there will be a new unique key generated in the real time. This scheme
over comes the problem of public and private key concept where it will exposed if the mobile is
shared with the intruder. The solutions proposed by us in this thesis are not attempted before.
1.5 Organization of Thesis
Chapter 2 provides the over view of the proposed scheme using voice. Chapter 3 explains
the experimental setup and Data collection. Chapter 4 presents about the proposed protocol and
how we can overcome the two important types of attacks by the intruder. Chapter 5 consists of
evaluation of the algorithm and results for different set of vowels and words. Chapter 6 provides
the future work and concludes the thesis.
1.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we explained importance of security in mobile devices and our motivation
in using voice for key generation compared to other bio metrics. We also discussed about the
challenges faced in using voice and advantages of our protocol compared to voice authentication
software.
7

CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In order for the voice enabled key management technique to perform effectively, the
algorithm must be able to generate unique set of keys for each and every of iteration. Human
voice produce a series of harmonic sounds, frequencies etc. each of this sound is attributed
uniquely to each person and is different each time they speak. Even though the intruder is able
to capture the phrase what we are using for key generation, the intruder cannot replicate the
exact signal because the harmonics of the sound, the maximum frequency component, the sound
pressure and the exact length of the signal are different each time anyone speaks.
2.1 Problem Statement
The main goal of the project is to build an algorithm to generate keys in runtime which
are shared between two devices just prior to start of communication. The algorithms must be
independent of internet and which can be implemented efficiently on a smart phone.
2.2 Summary of the Proposed Protocol
The user places two mobile devices in the close proximity and at equal distance from the
origin of sound. Then the user generates an audio signal through their vocal cords which will be
recorded on both the mobile devices. Each of the two mobile devices independently process this
data to generate the set of values which are to be shared between them.
According to the Nyquist-Shannon theorem we need to maintain double the sampling
rate for the frequency we want to measure without losing any information. The normal frequency
8

of human voice ranges between 500 Hz to 2 kHz. So, it’s clearly sufficient for us to maintain 4410
samples per second as the sampling rate. So, each mobile after collecting the data, performs
down sampling on it. Once the data is down sampled, absolute FFT is performed on the signal to
change it into frequency domain and change the complex FFT signal to absolute signal. We
rounded the signal to two places after the decimal to demonstrate feasibility.
 Why cannot we use the direct sound pressure, why did we do the FFT?
The most important reason we performed FFT on the time domain of the signal is
because, the speech signal have changing frequency characteristics. Such characteristics cannot
be captured effectively by making use of time domain alone. More over in the original sound
pressure signal the values are very less i.e. 0.00074 dB except the places where there are peaks,
which does not support our proposed algorithm model. More importantly as we are dealing with
the voice signals frequency domain plays a major role. In the frequency domain the signal is
mirror imaged, so we considered only first half of the signal for the algorithm to process.
We parse 250 values around the maximum value in the frequency domain signal. So, there
will be a total of 501 values in each mobile including maximum value. We use these frequency
values to generate the shared secret key.
 Why did we consider 250 values around maximum? Why not it can be 300 or any other
number?
When we take complete signal, most part of the signal is oscillating at very low values,
there will be many random matches which is not desired. We want to match where there is
similar pattern of the wave in the both signals. From our 40 experiments, we observed that the
very similar pattern of the signal is observed mostly in the areas where there is a peak in the
9

signal and that too 250 values around the signal on an average is calculated from the 40
experiments. Now each of the mobile device embed their parsed 501 values into the bloom filter
and shared with the other mobile. There are some extra features added to enhance the security
features which are discussed in the subsequent sessions.
 Why Bloom filter? Why can’t we send all the 501 values directly?
Yes, we can send the data in plain text without using a bloom filter, but there is lack of
security. If the intruder captures while we are sending the information, he can spoof like original
mobile as he will have all 501 values. To overcome this problem we need to send the data via
bloom filter. Even though the intruder captures bloom filter it’s very hard for him to decode the
original values which are inserted into it, because bloom filter has only 0’s and 1’s to represent a
number and entries are hashed using one-way has functions.
2.3 Bloom Filter
2.3.1 Bloom Filter Mechanism
Bloom filter is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure, introduced by Howard Bloom
in 1970. This is used to test if the element is a member of the set. False positive matches are
possible. But, false negative matches are not. The false positive nature can be reduced by
increasing the size of the bloom filter and introduce highly random hash functions to insert the
elements into bloom filter.
The empty bloom filter is a bit array of m bits, which is all set to zero. There are h different
hash functions defined, where each of the hash function maps to one of m bit position with a
uniform random distribution. The number of hash functions h is a constant and is much smaller
than size of bloom filter m. h and m are determined by the intended false positive rate of filter.
10

2.3.2 Adding and Querying Element into Bloom Filter
The adding of element into the bloom filter follows the process of feeding it to each of h
hash function to get h array positions and set the bits of all these positions to 1.
To check if the element is present in the bloom filter, feed it to all the h hash functions
and get h array positions. Check these array positions, if any of the bits at these positions is 0,
the element is definitely not in the set. This is because, if it was there in the set, previously when
the element is inserted it would have changed to 1.
Removing an element from the bloom filter is impossible because false negatives are not
permitted. An elements maps to k bits in the array, for removing the element it’s sufficient to
make any one of the bits to zero. But this also results in removing any other elements that happen
to map onto that bit. It’s impossible to determine whether any other elements have been
associated with that bit. So, clearing of bit and removing elements from bloom filter results in
false negatives, which is why removing elements is prohibited.
2.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we examined the related work already done in key generation from voice
using complex algorithms like MFCC, Voice Biometrics etc. We also explained the problem
statement of this experiment and summary of the protocol discussed in the further sections. We
have examined the mechanism of bloom filter, how elements are added into it, querying the
bloom filter for the element if it’s present etc.
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CHAPTER 3: DATA COLLECTION
The sensitivity of the microphone will be vary across different mobiles. So, if we use
different mobiles for recording the sound generated the data collected will not be coherent. To
make the data collected consistent across all the experiments. We performed this experiment
using exact similar Samsung S5 phones to record the sound data.
3.1 Setting the Environment for Experiment
While conducting the experiment we have placed all the mobiles on a plane surface and
at equal heights. The two phones on where the original experiment is being conducted is placed
next to each other (i.e. 0.5 cm away from each other) and we generated the sound through vocal
cords in the middle of two phones and 1.5 feet away from them. So that the origin of speech and
distance of the two microphones is almost equal. The intruder phones are placed at 5 and 10
feet from the original experiment to eavesdrop the data when performing the experiment. The
intruder phones are placed at exact same orientation of the original phones.
The experiment is conducted in a quiet room with the Sound Pressure level is at 42 dB,
we recorded the sound generated by using the voice recorder application which is available in
any smart phone
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3.2 Data Collection Process
We generated vowel sounds like (A, E, I, O, U), consonants (B, F, J, M, S), little complex
(CAT, MET, PIN) and more complex words like HELLO, DATA, SECRET, COMPLICATED etc. The
vowel sounds are not the normal alphabetical sounds, but the Actual phonetic sounds of vowels
Each experiment is iterated 10 times for collecting the average consistency. We collected
data for loud voice with average sound pressure of 72 dB, normal conversation voice with
average of 61 dB sound pressure and whisper sound with average sound pressure of 44 dB
Before we perform every iteration we first start all the voice recorders and then the sound
is generated near the original phones where the intruder phones are at 5 and 10 feet away. We
recorded all the utterances of the data for 1 male and 1 female voices and took the average of
both to normalize the number of bits shared. There are 18 unique words/ Vowel sounds uttered
total of 10 iteration for each utterance and 3 levels of sound for each sound generated. After
performing all the experiments we segregated the files manually and performed analysis on it
which is described in detail in the following sections.
3.3 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we discussed about the experimental set up and data collection process.
In first part of the chapter we discussed about environment set up for the experiment and in the
second part we explained how the data collection is performed and what measures are taken
into consideration while performing the experiment.
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CHAPTER 4: PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section we present our protocol, explain the process of key generation between
the two mobile devices and describe how the proposed technique overcomes the passive and
active attack models in detail.
4.1 Core Requirements for Implementing the Protocol
For convenience, we recall the core requirements for implementing our protocol are as
follows
a. Before the start of a secure communication, our technique should ensure that both
devices share the same key with a high probability without sending the key in plaintext.
b. The generation of keys must be user initiated.
c. At each round of communication, the key generation must be unique from prior keys.
d. The protocol must be robust enough to prevent practical attackers from exposing the key
under two attacks. The first attack model is a) one where the adversary is in the vicinity
of the on-going communication initiated by the user and the attacker tries to eavesdrop
on the communication to decipher they key. We call this attack as a passive attack. The
second attack model is more of an active attack where the attacker tries to replicate
whatever action the user initiates to setup the key in order to recreate the key.
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4.2 Attack Models
4.2.1 Passive Attack
In this attack model the adversary places the mobile device in the vicinity of the ongoing
communication initiated by the user and uses a mobile phone to eavesdrop on the sound
generated by the vocal cords to decipher the key. Here for our experiments we considered the
adversary places his mobile device at 5 and 10 feet to eavesdrop on communication. We call this
type of attack as passive attack model.
4.2.2 Active Attack
In this model the attacker observes when the experiment is being conducted and tries to
replicate the same type of sound which the user initiated for setting up the key in order to
recreate the key. With this generated key the attacker tries to decrypt the messages exchanged
by the original mobiles. We consider this type of attack as active attack model.
4.3 Proposed Protocol in Detail
The two mobile devices used for communication are placed on a plane surface and in the
close proximity. The user generates the sound through their vocal cords, which will be recorded
by the mobile device’s microphone. The sound is generated in the middle of both the phones to
maintain equal distance between the point of origin of sound and microphone. We have taken
enough care to maintain 1.5 feet distance between the microphone and the point of generation
of sound all the time for consistency.
Once the sound is recorded by both the mobiles, each of the mobile phones process the
data independently to generate the set of values which will be shared between them for key
generation. As discussed in the previous sections, according to the Nyquist-Shannon theorem we
15

need to maintain at least double the sampling rate compared to the frequency we want to
measure. The normal frequency of human voice ranges from 500 Hz to 2 KHz. The data collected
through the mobile communication device is at the sampling rate of 44100 samples/sec. To make
the data able to process easily on a smart phone we have down sampled it to 4410 samples/sec.
This makes the protocol to reduce the overhead of dealing with large data without losing any
information.
The data which is originally collected is in time domain and is called as sound pressure.
Sound pressure is defined as the instantaneous pressure at a point in the presence of sound wave
and the static pressure of the medium. After having the down sampled data, both the mobile
devices independently process the resulting time domain sound pressure signal to FFT where it
will have all the frequency components of the signal embed in it. We performed FFT on the
original signal because, as speech signal have changing frequency characteristics, which cannot
capture all the useful data effectively using time domain alone. We also observed values in the
original signal are very less (i.e. 0.00043 dB) except the places where there are high sound
pressure peaks. Our protocol is designed in such a way that it focuses on similarities and features
in both the signals of the original mobile devices to generate the key. So, if most values are in the
lower range then it will contradict with the protocol model.
The original FFT signal with complex number value increases the bit transfer rate, and
from our experiments we observed that very less number of values exactly match with the
complex numbers generated in other mobile which is not desired for key generation process. So,
we transformed the Fast Fourier transform of the signal to the absolute FFT, where it will have
values in the form of real numbers. So, once we get the absolute signal we are applying rounding
16

to two digits after decimal to the each value in the data. The rounding is done to make the
protocol detect the values generated in other mobile and to reduce the overhead of
communicating with large numbers. For an instance an absolute FFT value of 4.007291 will be
rounded off to 4.01. The absolute FFT of the signal will be having the mirror image which is
redundant for our protocol for key calculation purpose. So, we are dividing the signal into two
equal parts and consider the first part for our process of key generation. From here when we
refer the FFT signal we mean the signal which is obtained after the going through the process of
removing the redundancy.
4.3.1 Algorithm for Preprocessing and Splitting the Data/ Code
The algorithm below explains the process of transforming the time domain sound
pressure signal to frequency domain where it will have all the frequency components embed into
it. It also explains the process of how the data is parsed from the FFT signal for sharing with other
mobile during the key generation process.
 Down sample the signal by using decimate function
rs = decimate(signal, 10)
 Convert the resultant signal (rs) to absolute FFT
rs1 = abs(fft(rs))
 Remove the redundant signal (mirror image) from rs1 by considering only first half
middle = ceil (numel(rs1)/2);
final_signal = rs1(1:middle)
 Round the values in the FFT to two places after the decimal point in final_signal
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 Search for the location at which maximum value occurred in the final_signal and call it
as maximum_location
 If maximum_location is greater than 251th location parse the 250 values around the
maximum. i.e. total of 501 values including the maximum value
 Else
consider the location of the maximum value as maximum_location
parse the values from start of the signal to the maximum_location value
and also 250 values above from maximum_location.
END
We observed from our experiments that the signal generated for every iteration in two
original phones is very much similar around the peak areas. Figure 4.2 shows how both of the
signals in the original communication device follow similar pattern around the peaks and intruder
has a complete different pattern which is 5 feet away from the experiment.
We made our protocol to parse the values around the maximum values which will cover
the similar pattern followed in both the mobiles. From the previous experiments we were able
to come up with 250 values around the maximum value will giving the optimum results for our
protocol. If we consider the complete signal we will take many redundant values which may not
help our protocol to create a secured secret key.
In the following sections we will discuss the results obtained for different kinds of sounds
produced by human voice and the length of key shared for each type of sound generated from
human voice.
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We considered Vowel, consonants and simple words to perform the key generation for
our experiments. We also observed that if we use more complex words there are many peaks
formed where there are vowel sounds.

Figure 4.1 Comparison of FFT signal between the original and intruder at 5 feet
Once the FFT signal is obtained, the algorithms searches for the maximum value in the set
of values its containing. After identifying the maximum value, it then parses 250 values around
the maximum value (both sides). So, there will be a total of 501 values including the maximum
parsed in each of the mobile device.
Now each mobile device independently embed their parsed 501 values (may be less
sometimes when the maximum location is not greater than 251) into the bloom filter and send
across to another original mobile device on which the experiment is being conducted. If we send
this data in the plain text the intruder can eavesdrop the data and impersonate as the original
mobile, which must be avoided.
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In each of the original mobile devices once the bloom filter is received from other original
mobile device, they check the generated data by querying the elements from bloom filter. For
our protocol to function effectively we need to maintain the false positive rate at near to 0%,
because the key should be exactly same in both the mobile devices. With the right choice of
parameters in the bloom filter, we can ensure the false positive rate at very low. Once each of
the mobile device queries its derived data it has with the bloom filter obtained from other mobile
device, the matched entries are integrated to form the shared key. The shared secret which has
been obtained will be exactly same in both the mobile devices. The number of bits shared for
different range of sounds by the original mobiles and intruder is discussed in subsequent
sections.
During the case of using normal human voice (Avg 62 dB level) for generating a key by
using our algorithm, the intruder at 5 feet was able to capture only 3% to 5% on an average of
the data which is generated as the key.
Here the algorithm for preprocessing and the protocol is publicly available and intruder
can follow exact same process as we are following. But here the intruder will have a data
generated 5 or 10 feet away from the microphone. So, most of the values are really very less
compared to the original values. So, there are very less matches with the original signal. If we
considered the complete signal instead of parsing, the intruder was able to eavesdrop more than
30% which is not desired. So, we choose to parse the signal for the relevant 501 values.
Even though the intruder captures any of the bloom filter of original mobile devices while
they are communicating, the intruder will not be able to recreate the secret key which is shared
by the two original phones because with the values intruder has he can maximum create 5 % of
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the original key which is useless in case of shared secret key mechanism. So, sending data by
embedding the values in the bloom filter solves our passive attack model when the intruder tries
to eavesdrop on communication between the original mobile devices from a distance of 5 and
10 feet.
If the intruder observes the experiment is being conducted and tries to replicate the same
type of sound which the user generated for setting up the key and impersonates as the original
user by sending the bloom filter by embedding the values to any of the two original mobiles. Here
the intruder cannot recreate the exact key which the original mobiles are sharing, but the
intruder can recreate some percent of the values which the original mobile devices are sharing.
But we know that if the intruder want to get access the data he need to know the exact key, not
even 99.99 % will work to decrypt the data.

Figure 4.2 Maximum frequency component and sound pressure of signal
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4.4 Bloom Filter Structure After Adding Data Values

Figure 4.3 Structure of bloom filter after embedding the data values
The above figure represents how the data values, sound pressure level and maximum
frequency component values are added into the bloom filter in each of the mobile device
independently on which original experiment is being conducted. Once both the mobile device
embed these values into their respective bloom filter, the original mobiles will send the 930 bytes
bloom filter to each other. The number of hash functions are fixed to 10 because we need to
maintain the false positive rate of 0.1% to make our protocol function effectively. The
calculations that made to come up with the size of the bloom filter, number of hash functions
used and the range of feature values inserted into the bloom filter are described in detail in the
subsequent chapters.
After receiving the bloom filter from any mobile device even from the intruder, both the
original mobiles queries its derived sound pressure value and maximum frequency component
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value with bloom filter. If any one or both features are not present in the bloom filter then there
is a high chance that the bloom filter is sent by the attacker and then algorithm simply rejects
searching any further saving its resources. By using this technique the algorithm is overcoming
the denial of service attack in the very starting itself. If and only if the two features are matching
with the values present in the bloom filter it then proceed to check the values to generate the
key. The sound pressure and maximum frequency component in the FFT cannot be replicated by
the intruder because the intensity and frequency component of the sound varies for every
iteration.
There is a very slim chance that the situation of considering the original mobile as an
intruder and denying the access may happen. In this case we need to perform the experiment
once again and generate the key.
4.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we explained the state-of-art security protocol and how the proposed
protocol overcomes the passive and active attacks by the intruder. The challenges faced and how
we overcome them during the implementation. We discussed about the features derived from
the vocal cords generated voice and how we can use these features in our technique.
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CHAPTER 5: IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTOCOL
In this chapter we will discuss the applications of bloom filter and its implementation in
our protocol.
5.1 Bloom Filter Applications
In this section we will discuss some of the common applications of bloom filters in the
technologies we use every day. Bloom filter is extensively used in application where false
positives is ok, but false negative cannot be.
When we send email to people, the browser side java script quickly checks the Bloom
filter in the browser cache for the respective email addressed.
 What’s the advantage of using bloom filter in the above example?
It avoids the round trip to back end servers to verify whether or not these email addresses
are already in our contact list. As we already know, bloom filters are excellent at telling you what
is not in a set. In this case this will tell us with email addresses that are not in our contact list.
Bloom filters may sometimes encounter false positives- usually the false positive rate can
be lowered if the length and number of hash functions are optimally chosen depending on
number of elements going into the bloom filter. The goal of bloom filter is to make cheap and
high probability guesses. In case of few false positives, you will need to detect those missing
entries yourself.

24

One other common application is probably testing to see if an element exists on disk
before performing any input or output operation. We risk sometimes looking for something
that’s not there, but you will never skip testing a segment because bloom filter said it wasn’t
there and it was. This mechanism should reduce the I/O lookups dramatically over the large data
sets.
Bloom filter is also used in plugins to keep track of the pages that given user has visited
without actually being able to enumerate the links they have visited. This helps the plugin
developers to address the concerns that people may have about having their plugin on their
system. The Bloom filter only enables us to test if a URL has been visited but not enumerate the
URL they visited.
5.2 Implementation of Bloom Filter in Protocol
There is a predefined formula for selecting the size of the bloom filter and number of hash
functions to be used for optimal results with low false positive.
where,
N: No. of items we expect to have in our Bloom filter
P: False positive rate acceptable (0 to 1)
M: No. of bits needed for implementing the bloom filter
K: No. of Hash functions used
The formula for calculating the no. of bits (M)
M = - [N * ln (P)] / (ln (2) ^2)
The formula for calculating the no. of Hash functions
K = M/N * ln (2)
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We have discussed in the earlier chapters that we need to insert 501 entries derived from
the vocal cords generated signal, max frequency component of the signal and sound pressure
level into the bloom filter.
From previous chapters we understand that the shared secret should be exact same set
of values which are shared between the two original mobiles. So, we need to make sure the false
positive rate is kept tending to zero.
After doing the math for calculating the length of the bloom filter and no. of hash
functions used to implement our protocol. We know that no. of derived values from sound to be
inserted into the bloom filter is 501 and let’s assume we want the false positive rate be 0.1%. To
achieve this false positive rate we need to use 10 hash functions.
This makes N = 501, P = 0.001 and K = 10
M = -501 * ln (0.001) / (ln (2) ^2)
M = 7204 bits
In the bloom filter apart from the derived sound pressure level values, we also need to
insert the range of sound pressure level and maximum frequency component. All the values here
are round off to whole numbers. The average error rate of sound pressure is less than 4% and
the range is in between 40 dB to 80 dB in our experiments, so we need to insert 7 values around
the sound pressure value derived. i.e. if the derived sound pressure is 60 dB, we need to insert
57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63 values into the bloom filter. The error difference in between the
maximum frequency components of the original mobile is less than 0.3 % and the usual range is
between 400 Hz to 2000 Hz. So, by considering the error rate we need to insert 4 values around
the maximum frequency component occurred place, total of 9 values including the maximum
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frequency value. i.e. if the max frequency component is 1034 Hz, we need to insert values from
1029 to 1038 into the bloom filter. The above error rates are calculated by taking average of all
the experiments conducted. So, the total number of values that are being inserted into the bloom
filter are sum of 501 derived values, 7 values of sound pressure level and 9 values of the maximum
frequency component which is 517 values.
So, the total number of bits the bloom filter should have to get the optimal results for the
shared key distribution protocol is 7434 bits, which is equal to 930 bytes.

Figure 5.1 Graph to represent relation between the no.of entries in bloom filter Vs size
The above figure represents the trend of size of the bloom filter for No. of entries into it.
We can observe that the trend line is growing exponentially as the no. of entries into the bloom
filter increase. To form this above graph we took the false positive rate at 0.1 % and no. of hash
functions used to insert entries into the bloom filter are 10. The values for number of bits in the
bloom filter is calculated by using the formula specified above.
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Figure 5.2 Graph to represent no.of hash functions is constant
We can observe from the above figure that, no. of hash functions is constant for any no.
of entries. This is because to expect a 0.1% of false positive rate we need 9.96 hash functions
(calculated by using the formula above). So, in total we need 10 hash functions and the size of
the bloom filter to be 7434 bits which equal to 930 bytes to implement the protocol with a false
positive rate of 0.1 %.
5.3 Chapter Summary
In this section we discussed the real-time applications of bloom filter, formula used to
calculate the size of the bloom filter and how it is implemented in our proposed protocol.
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CHAPTER 6: EVALUATION OF PROTOCOL
In this chapter, we present the results obtained and insights gained form the experiments.
We also present a detailed analysis on different types of sounds created by vocal cords and their
impact on the key generation process.
We performed the experiments with three different levels of sounds. The first type of
sound is a very loud sound with the average sound pressure level of 72 dB. The second sound can
be compared to the level of sound produced conversation between two persons. This has an
average sound pressure level of 61 dB. The third level of sound is whisper with the sound level
of 44 dB.
We have performed the experiments using vowel sounds (A, E, I, O, U), consonants (B, F,
J, M, S) and little complex words with one vowel in between them like CAT, MET, PIN The
selection of consonant sounds is done in such a way that they are evenly distributed across all
the alphabets. When we have generated complex words or phrases with multiple vowels in
between them, we observed that the peaks are inconsistent in the original mobile devices. So,
we consider only vowel sounds and complex words with single vowel between them work
effectively as they have the very similar pattern in the signal around the peaks.
The sound pressure of the environment in which we are conducting the experiment is
around 42 dB on an average. All the reading of sound pressure are measured by the sound meter
application available in the smart mobile. Each of the type sound produced by vocal cords is
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iterated 10 times to check for the consistencies in the data and consider the average to normalize
the data. Because, we have observed that our technique is generating unique keys and features
for every iteration which is strongly desirable in providing real time security.
To understand the quantity of data transferred and key shared we convert the list of key
values in each of the mobile device into number of bits and aggregated them. Below are the data
which describes number of bits shared by level of sound (loud, normal, whisper) and for the each
type of sound (Vowels, consonants etc.) generated by the vocal cords.
6.1 Number of Bits Shared for Loud Sound
Table 6.1: No.of bits shared between the original devices and intruder for loud sound
Sound Generated by
vocal cords

Bits shared b/w
original phones

Bits shared b/w
intruder at 5 feet and
intersection
of
original phones

Bits shared b/w
intruder at 10 feet
and intersection of
original phones

Sound
Pressure
values (dB-units )

A

642

47

42

69

E

784

76

19

73

I

947

102

24

64

O

642

28

0

75

U

497

84

78

67

B

824

216

106

77

F

725

183

114

76

J

1005

309

217

78

M

740

274

98

73

S

798

266

172

69

CAT

937

122

33

68

MET

866

0

15

63

PIN

723

45

4

72

POT

651

82

48

70

HUB

924

113

107

66
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The above values for number of bits shared are derived from the loud sound generated
by the vocal cord. We can observe that even though consonant sounds were able to share similar
number of bit compared to the vowel sounds and complex words, the intruder at 5 feet was
sharing more than 25% of the exact keys in all the cases that are shared by the original mobile
devices on which key generation process is initiated by the user. Intruder at 10 feet was able to
share on an average 20% of the secret key shared by the original mobile devices.
6.2 Number of Bits Shared for Normal Sound
Table 6.2: No.of bits shared between the original devices and intruder for normal sound
Sound Generated by
vocal cords

Bits shared b/w
original phones

Bits shared b/w
intruder at 5 feet and
intersection
of
original phones

Bits shared b/w
intruder at 10 feet
and intersection of
original phones

Sound
Pressure
values (dB-units )

A

709

18

6

65

E

786

74

0

61

I

729

62

3

64

O

768

38

27

66

U

697

58

24

64

B

712

147

92

61

F

834

121

103

56

J

907

176

119

58

M

863

132

97

63

S

913

181

127

52

CAT

794

27

18

64

MET

972

0

0

66

PIN

604

14

2

62

POT

1018

34

63

65

HUB

986

37

51

61
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The above values are derived from the sounds generated from the normal sound level
with the average sound pressure level of 61 dB. These values follow the same trend as the
previous loud sounds. We observe on an average they share similar number of bits. We can also
observe that the intruder at 5 and 10 feet was able to share more than 22 % and 18% for sounds
of consonants. On the other hand the intruder at 5 feet was able to share a very small portion
i.e. less than 4% of the data on an average for the only vowel and complex words sound.
6.3 Number of Bits Shared for Whisper
Table 6.3: No.of bits shared between the original devices and intruder for whisper
Sounds produced

Bits shared b/w
original phones

Bits shared b/w
intruder at 5 feet and
intersection
of
original phones

Bits shared b/w
intruder at 10 feet
and intersection of
original phones

Sound
Pressure
values (dB-units )

A

1706

105

131

48

E

1241

129

195

41

I

1057

117

168

47

O

1411

48

103

39

U

1512

99

141

41

B

609

83

294

43

F

1003

13

33

42

J

681

135

225

36

M

967

102

183

37

S

642

126

198

35

CAT

1156

119

27

37

MET

570

174

264

36

PIN

794

99

171

40

POT

1394

57

129

38

HUB

1064

135

285

39
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The above values are derived from the sounds generated by whisper, with the average
sound pressure level of 44 dB. As we can see whisper sound for all the types of sound shares
relatively more number of secret key values compared to the normal and loud sounds. One
reason we observed for this kind of occurrence is the low level of signal. As most of the signal
values are very low and if there is a slight noise created while stopping the recorder or by the
user itself, this result in the algorithm picking up that value as the maximum and parse the data.
Example for such instance is shown below in the figure 6.1. Here in the graph below Y axis is the
sound pressure and X axis is time. As we know whisper have very less sound pressure level, the
values in the graph are also low. We can observe in phone 2 there is a little noise while stopping
the audio signal, then we have observed a peak in the signal. This makes our algorithm to consider
second peak while parsing data for embedding into bloom filter, which is not desirable. So, to
avoid these type of complication we recommend to use only vowel sounds or complex words
with one vowel sound to generate a secured secret key by using our technique.

Figure 6.1 Sound pressure signal of whisper sound
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6.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we have observed the results obtained for different levels and types of
sounds generated by the human voice. We observed that even though whisper sound share more
number of bits for the original mobile devices, the intruder during whisper sound is also sharing
significant amount of the data. From our experiments we observed that normal level of sounds
and vowels and simple words produced better results for our proposed protocol.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we demonstrated the feasibility of generating a shared secret key from
sound generated by the vocal cords. We mainly focused on making our technique generate
unique key for every iteration and making it process the data independently over a smart phone,
which is lacking in commercial voice authentication software available. Most of the voice
authentication software uses complex algorithms like MFCC, Dynamic Time Wrapping etc. which
require lot of overhead and nearly impossible to make it process on the smartphone. Usually in
these commercially available software the data collected while user generates the sound is sent
via internet to the server and processed over there and sent back to the user. Which rises another
security issue with transfer of data over the internet. So, we primarily focused on making the
algorithm independent and be able to function on smartphone.
Our proposed protocol potentially overcomes the passive and active attacks by the
intruder. Passive attacks are when the adversary places his mobile device in the vicinity of the
ongoing communication initiated by the user and tries to eavesdrop on the sound generated by
the vocal cords to decipher the key. Active attacks are when the attacker observes when the
experiment is being conducted and tries to replicate the same sound which the user initiated for
setting up the key in order to recreate the key. With this generated key the attacker tries to
impersonate as original mobile device.
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We propose our novel technique of generating a cryptographic key from user generated
voice and used bloom filter mechanism to transfer the data between the original communicating
mobile devices. Our proposed algorithm will have almost a zero false positive rate (0.1%)
because, while calculating the size of bloom filter and number of hash functions we can specify
the acceptable false positive rate which is set to 0.1%.
There is a very slim chance (less than 0.5%) that the situation of considering the original
mobile as an intruder and denying the access may happen. This happens when the maximum
frequency component and time at which the maximum occurred in the sound pressure signal
does not fall in the error range. In this case we need to perform the experiment once again and
generate the key.
7.2 Future Work
In future we are going to generalize the above experiments to consider all types of smart
phones instead of restricting to one single model. We are also interested in developing a
dedicated app, which records the voice and process the data by using our protocol and gives
output of the shared secret key between the two mobile devices after querying the bloom filter
received. We also want to make this application share the data between multiple devices (more
than two devices) at the same time.
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APPENDIX A
BLUETOOTH LOW ENERGY (BLE) SNIFFER, EAVESDROPPING THE DATA
A.1 Abstract
Fitbit is a fitness tracker, it records all the physical activities and then using Bluetooth low
energy (BLE) it sends the data to smartphone. BLE Sniffer can sniff packages and by using
Wireshark they could be analyzed. So the question is, could these packages be decrypted and
altered?, The following demo will show how sniffing of packages can be done.
A.2 BLE Sniffer
BLE Sniffer (nRF51822 – v1.0) from adafruit was used in this demo. This sniffer works only
with BLE and only with Bluetooth version 4.0. That’s a great fit to use it with Fitbit.

Figure A1 BLE sniffer (nRF51822 – v1.0)
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A.3 Software
nRF-Sniffer from adafruit is recommended to use with BLE Sniffer. This software scans all
the possible devices that could be sniffed. After the device is choses, then Wireshark will be used
to analyze and navigate the packages.
A.4 nRF- Sniffer
First step is to plug in the sniffer to PC and start nRF-Sniffer. Similar screen as below will
be displayed.

Figure A2 Display of nRF sniffer
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There are 3 devices, if the sniffer is not able to recognize and tell which one is Fitbit, then
it is necessary to run Wireshark on each device and analyze packages. In order to start Wireshark
enter the device number and press W.

Figure A3 Connecting to the device
A.5 Wireshark
Wireshark is used to sort packages, navigate through them and most importantly it is easy
to ignore empty packages. If the Fitbit is not connected to anything and awaits pairing then it will
send ADV_IND packages that do not contain any data regards to the activity of the user.
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Figure A4 Wireshark readings of packet transfer
After connection with smartphone has been established, the packets will start to contain
the actual data. The data packages are encrypted.
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